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Artikel ini membahas politik distributif bersifat programatik pada masa pandemi CO-
VID-19 pada lingkup desa-desa di Kabupaten Sampang. Pertanyaan yang diangkat ada-
lah bagaimana bentuk pemanfaatan sumber daya berbasis barang-barang programatik 
(programmatic goods) pada masa pandemi COVID-19 di wilayah pedesaan Kabupaten 
Sampang. Artikel ini memilih metode penelitian kualitatif dan mengambil studi kasus 
sepuluh desa di Kabupaten Sampang. Asumsi pemilihan lokasi desa berdasarkan kemu-
dahan proses penelitian saat pandemi dan Sampang mempertahankan status wilayah 
zona hijau paling lama di Jawa Timur. Artikel ini menunjukkan relasi kekuasaan bupati 
dengan kepala desa bergeser dari cenderung transaksional saat situasi normal menjadi 
kolaboratif saat menghadapi krisis pandemi. Studi ini juga memverifikasi konsep politik 
programatik di Sampang dengan fokus tiga syarat berikut, yaitu ketepatan penerima 
manfaat, keterbukaan informasi, dan komitmen pelaksanaan tanpa diskriminasi. Studi 
ini menemukan pula bahwa kepala desa berperan sebagai broker yang efektif berda-
sarkan implementasi program-program kesejahteraan desa yang dikaitkan dengan 
penanganan pandemi, seperti posko relawan desa lawan COVID-19, masker gratis 
bagi warga desa, penyaluran BLT- Dana Desa (BLT-DD) untuk warga desa miskin dan 
terdampak pandemic, pembagian paket sembako, akses internet gratis di setiap desa
Kata kunci:  Politik distributif, barang-barang programatik, pandemi, COVID-19. 
ABSTRACT
This article discusses programmatic distributive politics in the villages in Sampang 
Regency during the COVID-19 pandemic. This study seeks to answer the forms of pro-
grammatic goods distributed in Sampang during the pandemic. This study employs 
qualitative methods and chose ten villages in Sampang as its case study due to Sam-
pang’s achievement in maintaining its green zone status for the longest period in East 
Java. This article shows that there have been shifts in the bupati’s relationships with 
the village heads, from what was previously transactional prior to the pandemic to be 
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more collaborative in efforts to contain the spread of the virus. This study also finds 
that the practice of distributive politics in Sampang during the pandemic fulfills the 
three criteria of programmatic politics: the accuracy of beneficiaries, transparency, and 
commitment to distribute goods without discrimination. The village heads in Sampang 
have acted as effective brokers in the implementation of village welfare programs, such 
as the installment of village volunteer posts against COVID-19, the free mask program 
for villagers, the BLT-Village Fund (BLT-DD) scheme targeting villagers from low-income 
households affected by the pandemic, the distribution of staple foods (sembako), the 
smart village program that provides free internet access in every village.
Keywords:  Distributive politics, programmatic goods, pandemic, COVID-19.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7454/jp.v7i1.343
INTRODUCTION
In Indonesia, village heads (kepala desa) are expected to accumulate 
power resources and be highly respected by the community. The posses-
sion of power resources shapes the strength of village heads’ influence 
in their villages. These power resources include religious knowledge 
(particularly Islam), expertise and skills, martial arts and mysticism, 
material wealth, social work, and social positions or status (Iberamsjah 
2002, 75). As formal elites, village heads are hierarchically pushed to 
realize programs instructed from above, such as district heads (camat) 
and regents (bupati). However, on the other hand, their positions as 
informal elites require them to develop their own initiative to improve 
their villages. This means that village heads’ statuses are not only af-
fected by their formal authority, but also their traditional positions as 
bapak pelindung (godfathers) for their people (Tjiptoherijanto and Pri-
jono 1983, 38).
The role of bapak pelindung is needed when villagers face danger, 
such as the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. This particular 
role is vital in Java, which has been badly hit by the virus, with as many 
as 4,623 positive cases—just a little below Jakarta, which has 7,229 cas-
es—as of May 30, 2020 (Bayhaqi 2020). The spike in positive cases did 
not only occur at provincial level, but also at city and regency levels. In 
East Java, there is at least one region that has been relatively successful 
in handling COVID-19: the Sampang Regency. Therefore, this study 
thus chooses to use Sampang as its case study to investigate the role of 
49REFUSING TO DIE: PROGRAMMATIC GOODS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST COVID-19
village heads during the pandemic in relation to their connection to 
village residents and higher bureaucratic and political structures. 
Sampang was able to maintain its green zone status (meaning an 
absence of confirmed positive cases) for the longest time compared to 
other areas in the province. The regency’s first positive case—one per-
son—was announced on May 13, 2020. The following graph captures 
the spread of the virus in Sampang: 
Figure 1. COVID-19 Cases in Sampang. Source: Sampang Government n.d.
Bupati of Sampang, Slamet Junaidi, said that the success to maintain 
the green zone status was due to his government’s commitment in track-
ing both those who were at risk (Orang Dalam Resiko, ODR) and those 
under health monitoring (Orang Dalam Pemantauan, ODP) down to 
the village level. The Bupati also implemented a monitoring strategy 
called blusukan (unplanned visitations). He added that impromptu 
health checks were also commonly carried out at the regency, district, 
and village/sub-district levels. Checks at the later levels were done by 
village officials, medics from the puskesmas (community health centers) 
and village paramedics. Even the Bhabinkamtibmas (community police 
officers) and Babinsa (non-commissioned officers stationed in villages) 
were involved directly in these strategies (Taufiqurrahman 2020).
These programs were first implemented to anticipate the spread of 
COVID-19 and began with village heads’ instructions to follow Circular 
Letter of Bupati Sampang No. 440/655/434.203/2020 on Precaution and 
Prevention of COVID-19. The policy encourages heads of villages to 
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distribute free masks and, in doing so, involves the production efforts of 
local small and medium-sized enterprises. Village heads were also per-
mitted to utilize village funds (dana desa) to handle COVID-19 (Basri 
2020). In fact, the bupati immediately instructed the village heads in 
Sampang to use their village funds to ensure that the people were safe 
and, more specifically, to prioritize policies aimed at containing the 
spread of the virus (Hidayat 2020). 
Thus, we can say that the success of the responses to the pandemic 
in Sampang was heavily shaped by the role that the village heads played 
in implementing the regional government’s policies. In Indonesia, vil-
lage heads and officials are vital for implementing social welfare pro-
grams (Aspinall and Rohman 2017). For example, they take part in 
identifying the recipients of public goods and their distribution. The 
enlarging role of the village head was influenced by changes in politi-
cal conditions in Indonesia. The power relationships between village 
elites and supra-village structures in Reformasi Era have changed; they 
were no longer as rigidly hierarchical as they were during the New 
Order. After Reformasi, these relationships were more mutual; while 
village heads were dependent on those structurally above the district 
heads and bupati, their superior officials were also dependent on village 
elites. Village heads have become more involved in pursuing govern-
ment projects and acted as brokers in distributing resources for village 
development as well as the maintenance of political power (Aspinall 
and Rohman 2017, 52). 
This article aims to elaborate on the success of the village heads 
in Sampang in implementing COVID-19 policies. More specifically, 
this article examines how public officials distributed resources through 
policies during the pandemic and contributed to Sampang’s overall 
achievement. To explore how resources are allocated through policy 
enactment at the village level, this article employs the concept of dis-
tributive politics. Simply put, this concept indicates that political power 
(through its political institutions: the executive and legislative) works 
as avenues for politicians to distribute and allocate resources. What is 
meant by resources is any item that enables or empowers people in their 
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power relationships with the authority, which may be publicly elected 
politicians or bureaucrats. These resources may be viewed in both mate-
rial and social terms (Wardani 2014). 
There are two forms of distributive politics: programmatic and non-
programmatic politics (Stokes et al. 2013). Previous studies on distribu-
tive politics in Indonesia tended to focus on non-programmatic goods—
clientelism and partisan bias. Several of these literature studies depict 
this phenomenon in the context of political contestation (Aspinall and 
Sukmajati 2015; Haliim 2019; Palenewen 2014; Saragintan and Hidayat 
2016). In elections, political parties or candidates will usually promise 
new policies that can bring material benefits for specific groups or 
classes. The benefits include, but are not limited to, fertilizers, farming 
subsidies, pension raises for the elderly, and scholarships for students 
from low-income families—some of these falls under the category of 
programmatic goods (Aspinall and Sukmajati 2015, 30). 
The study conducted by Palenewen (2014) focused on patronage 
between candidates and voters during the legislative election in Bitung. 
This study looked at clientelistic strategies of non-programmatic poli-
tics: patronage, vote-buying, and constituency service. Voters who did 
not cast their votes for the candidates practicing these strategies were 
denied material benefits. Palenewen’s (2014) study shows that most non-
programmatic strategies employed by candidates have been relatively 
successful in bringing victory. Due to this finding, Palanewen (2014) 
did not inquire into programmatic strategies. 
Two other studies looked at the partisan bias in the non-program-
matic distribution in Banten (Saragintan and Hidayat 2016) and Kediri 
(Haliim 2019). They captured the process of resource allocation in the 
form of grants and social aid, which could be categorized as pork-barrel 
politics. What was unique from the Banten case was that these grants 
and aid were targeted towards religion-based groups. In the case of 
Kediri, the grants were not specifically targeted for certain groups but 
were rather seen as political maneuvers that incumbents employed near-
ing election day. Incumbents promised to increase the amount of funds 
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for social aid through Prodamas (community empowerment program) 
up to 100% if they were re-elected. 
These studies demonstrate that non-programmatic distributions have 
high degrees of transactional characteristics, at least when viewed from 
the expectations of the regional elites enacting the distributive policies. 
This paper takes a different position by inquiring into the programmatic 
kind of distributive politics. More specifically, it shows that when public 
officials—in this case village heads—are faced with the dangers of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, the distribution of resources tends to be more 
programmatic. This study looks at the pandemic’s effects on the village 
elites’ decisions in distributing goods, particularly medical equipment 
through programs that aimed to control the pandemic, as well as work-
ing collaboratively—rather than transactionally—with the supra-village 
structures. Here we base our analysis on the handling of the pandemic 
in ten villages in Sampang, which was supported by information ob-
tained the bupati and the officials of the ten villages under study. 
THE THEORY OF DISTR IBUTI V E POLITICS A ND 
THE CONCEP T OF PROGR A MM ATIC GOODS
The concept of distributive politics emphasizes the type of available 
resources, which political actors typically distribute through policy 
programs. These programs provide material and social incentives for 
people’s obedience and support (Hidayat, Prasetyo, and Yuwana 2018). 
Thus, the distribution of resources through the public policy model is 
highly intertwined with the interests of political actors. As previously 
discussed, Wardani (2014) defined distributive politics as an arena of 
resource allocation and distribution. These resources are defined as any 
item that may enable or empower people in their power relationships 
with other parties, such as politicians and public officials.
Thus, politics is inevitably highly intertwined with the distribution of 
resources. The distribution of resources in politics is even deemed more 
dynamic than the distribution of market goods from an economic per-
spective. In democratic states, there are agreements (though they may 
not be in the form of consensus) that the political authority possesses 
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the right to do inter-generational distribution of resources through tax, 
which funds education or social safety nets. There are also agreements 
for distributing resources through welfare programs of the provision 
or jobs (Stokes et al. 2013). Nevertheless, simultaneously, distributing 
resources to build and strengthen political ties with private companies 
and giving cash in exchange for votes have also been widely criticized. 
This shows that the distribution of resources in politics, on the one 
hand, is deemed widely acceptable by society. However, on the other 
hand, it is also condemned to the extent that many perpetrators have 
been criminally charged, particularly those taking part in vote-buying 
(Stokes et al. 2013).
Nic Cheeseman et al. (2014) said that programmatic politics is a vital 
part of electoral contestation. This approach is used when (typically 
incumbent) candidates (of political parties) emphasize the successes of 
their past policies that served the public interest as well as the political 
promises for the next term, with the hopes of gaining votes in upcoming 
elections. Thus, political actors do not rely solely on identity-based po-
litical strategies (usually based on ethnicity and religion), charisma, and 
patronage. Parties that employ programmatic political strategies usually 
do not only offer public policies that are in accordance with people’s 
aspirations and interests, but also the parties’ ideologies (Cheeseman et 
al. 2014). Kitschelt (1995) and Stokes (2007) differentiate programmatic 
politics and clientelism based on the beneficiaries of public policy (for 
example, health insurance, loans, and subsidized housing). In program-
matic politics, beneficiaries are decided upon based on whether they 
fulfill the formal criteria to receive the goods and not because of their 
political affiliations. Clientelist politics, on the other hand, distribute 
goods mainly to the benefactors’ supporters. The main difference is 
that candidates who practice programmatic politics distribute resources 
indiscriminately, even to those who support their rivals, while actors 
exercising non-programmatic politics do not (Mas’udi and Kurniawan 
2017). 
The concept of distributive politics says that the programmatic dis-
tribution of goods is done through government or state policies. It is 
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thus reasonable that distributive politics of this kind is more commonly 
carried out by incumbents aiming to run again for the next term (Har-
janta 2018). 
How can we analyze whether programmatic politics has been prac-
ticed during the COVID-19 pandemic in Sampang? This paper elabo-
rates the indicators of programmatic goods to analyze this practice in 
the case of Sampang. As previously indicated, we shall elaborate these 
criteria by referring to Stoke’s (2009, 10) theories and Aspinall and Suk-
majati’s (2015, 30) findings. The first is that the formulation of the 
policy’s aims is open to public debate. The second is that the distribu-
tion rules are official and public. Third, the actual distribution of goods 
follows the public criteria that have been made. The following figure 
illustrates the distribution of resources done by the government to the 
public (Stokes et al. 2013, 31):
Figure 2. The Concept of Distribute Politics
Source: Stokes et al. (2013).
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The above figure shows that there are two forms of distributive poli-
tics: programmatic and non-programmatic politics. This study mainly 
aims to capture the distribution of programmatic goods in Sampang. 
The implementation of programmatic policies requires brokers, not to 
mobilize political support but rather mediate or bridge the interests of 
candidates and those of voters. Brokers play the role of gathering infor-
mation, including regarding the problems that the people are facing—
and in this case, particularly the needs of villagers who were impacted 
by COVID-19. The information that has been gathered would later 
be used to formulate solutions, which take the form of public policies. 
Before the pandemic, studies on programmatic goods in Asian coun-
tries have also been carried out, such as in Japan (Catalinac 2015) and 
India (Wyatt 2013). In Japan’s case, there has been a rise in campaigns 
for programmatic policies, mainly by LDP politicians, who focused on 
national security. One factor behind the popularization of program-
matic politics in Japan is the change in Japan’s electoral laws back 
in 1994. This shows that the rise of programmatic politics is not only 
shaped by voters’ preferences. Catalinac (2015) also found that both 
incumbent and opposition candidates have tended to rely on program-
matic politics in the past few years.  
The case of Tamil Nadu, India, shows a shift in the distribution 
of goods, from previously clientelistic to highly programmatic. For 
the past six years, two of the largest parties in Tamil Nadu, All India 
Anna Dravida Munnetra Kashagam (AIADMK) and Dravida Mun-
netra Kazhagam (DMK), have been adopting programmatic politics. 
For example, the two parties provided free health insurance, affordable 
housing, and protection from the expropriation of slum areas. The two 
parties also opened shops that handed out free food and sold some com-
modities at affordable prices in the villages and cities. This program 
is known to provide food subsidies through the Public Distribution 
(PDS) program, in which the recipients were those who fell under the 
category of beneficiaries of programmatic policies. Party officials also 
implemented the Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) and 
MGR Nutritious Noon Meal Scheme (NNMS). The ICDS aimed to 
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improve nutrition for infants, pregnant women, and breastfeeding moth-
ers, while the NNMS provided free meals for school-aged children in 
Tamil Nadu (Wyatt 2013).
This article offers a new perspective from the previous studies on 
programmatic politics, particularly in Japan and India, by looking into 
the most recent developments during the COVID-19 pandemic. One 
of the things that differentiate this situation from that of other contexts 
is its emergency and need for rapid and precise responses, which place 
political motives—which are usually at the center of non-programmatic 
politics—at the lowest end of the priority. Secondly, in the context of 
Indonesia, we mainly focus on programmatic politics, offering a dif-
ferent angle from those of the previous studies on distributive politics, 
which have tended to investigate the non-programmatic kind. Pale-
newen (2014) analyzed the process of resource allocation by elites and 
their parties—which used three methods: pork barrel politics, money 
politics, and constituency service—in the legislative elections in the 
city of Bitung. Aspinall and Sukmajati (2015) found five variations of 
patronage in non-programmatic distribution of resources during leg-
islative elections in Indonesia. Saragintan and Hidayat’s (2016) study 
on non-programmatic allocation of resources categorized the grants 
and social aid given out in Banten as a form of pork barrel politics that 
targeted religious groups. This article, thus, takes a different angle from 
the more established research of non-programmatic politics, as this 
study inquiries into programmatic distributive politics.
R ESEA RCH METHODS
This study employs a qualitative approach and conducts a case study 
of 10 villages in Sampang, East Java. This case is selected because of 
the uniqueness of Sampang as it succeeded in maintaining the green 
zone status for the longest in the province. Another reason is that we 
have been acquainted with the informants, which eased our process of 
obtaining research permits and gathering data during the pandemic. 
This article provides a descriptive analysis to present a detailed illus-
tration of the phenomenon under study. As Denzin and Lincoln stated,
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The word qualitative implies an emphasis on the qualities of entities 
and on processes and meanings that are not experimentally exam-
ined or measured (if measured at all) in terms of quantity, amount, 
intensity, or frequency. Qualitative researchers stress the socially 
constructed nature of reality, the intimate relationship between the 
researcher and what is studied, and the situational constraints that 
shape inquiry. (Denzin and Lincoln 2009, 10)
The phenomenon under study is the distribution of programmatic 
goods by local political actors at the village level during the COV-
ID-19 pandemic. Due to the pandemic, data could not be obtained by 
fieldwork in the villages where the informants reside. Thus, the tech-
nique we employed to get around this issue was conducting in-depth 
interviews with informants who were familiar with the phenomenon 
via telephone. These informants were the bupati of Sampang and ten 
village heads in Sampang. Secondary data, such as news and documen-
tation covering the handling of COVID-19 in Sampang, and related 
literature, were also assessed.
POW ER R EL ATIONS BET W EEN V ILL AGE 
HEA DS A ND BUPATI  IN SA MPA NG
When this article was written, regional governments were faced with 
the spread of the coronavirus disease. As formal leaders, both the bupati 
and village heads played a significant role in handling the pandemic 
because they possessed actual and potential power resources. According 
to Surbakti (2010), an individual is perceived to possess potential power 
if they have power resources such as wealth, land, weaponry, and social 
positions or status. An individual is said to have actual power when they 
have used these power resources in political activities to achieve his or 
her interests. In the case of Sampang, the public officials’ interests were 
to save their people from the dangers of COVID-19. 
During the crisis, the bupati and village heads were the local elites 
who collaborated to contain the spread of COVID-19. This emergency 
circumstance made their interactions inevitable. The pattern of interac-
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tions and power relations between them was always present in imple-
menting COVID-19 policies in the regency. Through his research on 
relations between village heads and the state, Nordholt (1987, 199) finds 
that village heads experience a duality of positions. On the one hand, 
village heads are elected by villages, which makes them accountable 
and necessitates them to cater to their villagers’ interests. On the other 
hand, they are government officials whose job is to ensure the imple-
mentation of government policies.
An observation of the development of government regulations on vil-
lages from the New Order to the reformasi era reveals that the relation-
ship between village heads and the state fluctuates depending on the 
political constellation between the central and local governments. This 
is because power relationships between political actors are influenced 
by the settings in which they exercise their powers. We shall now turn 
to the patterns of power relationships between village heads and the 
bupati to thoroughly illustrate this matter. 
During the New Order, the state positioned villages as ‘objects of 
co-optation’ in its hegemonic style of politics through Law No. 5/1979. 
This law sustained the power of the New Order through centralization 
and stability and made the government structure hierarchical. Such a 
structure weakened the village, rendering it the lowest-level govern-
ment unit and hindering its autonomy. The uniformity of villages could 
also mean that the power relationships between the regents and village 
heads were unequal in both their administrative and political aspects. 
Tjiptoherijanto and Prijono (1983) further explained that, in relation 
to their supra-village authorities, village heads tended to lose the tra-
ditional authority that mandated them to act as bapak pelindung to 
their villagers and initiators of their villages’ democracy. Consequently, 
village heads became more dependent on the supra-village structures.
During the reform era, decentralization created a shift in power rela-
tions, not only between the central and local governments, but also be-
tween villages and their higher authorities. Law No. 22/1999 treated the 
village as an autonomous institution. Although the law did not explicitly 
state that the village has its own government structure, its recognition 
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of the village’s historical and traditional rights meant that the village 
was recognized as an autonomous and legal entity (Maschab 2013, 141). 
This new definition not only positioned village heads as bureaucratic 
extensions of the supra-village structures (district heads, bupati, etc.) but 
also made the village head a political one. This amendment had im-
plications for the power relations between the bupati and village head. 
The village head tended to be autonomous in running his government, 
and the bupati supervision was limited to administrative matters.
In the post-reformasi era, villages were regulated under Law No. 
32/2004. Village governance was improved through the recentralization 
of administrative affairs and the increase of the village’s institutional 
capacity, which was previously semi-autonomous, such as the appoint-
ment of the village secretary as a state employee. Another new rule was 
that district heads were no longer above village heads, nor were they 
the direct ‘supervisor’ (pembina) of village governance. It was the bupati 
who held this role and had the authority to appoint village heads (Mas-
chab 2013, 151). Therefore, the relationship between the bupati and 
the village head became dominative-semi-autonomous. This is because 
the village head became accountable to the bupati, and, in return, the 
bupati needed the village head to maintain his/her power. 
Table 1: Power Relations between the Village Heads and Bupati
Period Law/Regulation Regulated Matters Relationship 
Type




















Note: Compiled from various sources.
The enactment of the most recent Law No. 6/2014 further improved 
the village head’s leverage in local politics. Aspinall and Rohman (2017) 
said that village heads act as brokers of supra-village programs and effec-
tive vote-getters during elections, particularly when the villagers depend 
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upon the village heads for government aid and welfare programs. Thus, 
the strengthening of the village head’s bargaining power contributes to 
the interdependent relationship between the village head and the bu-
pati. This form of relationship is also similar to that of the transactional 
style of leadership. 
The problems that occurred during the pandemic demand that 
regents and village heads realize programs effectively to prevent the 
spread of the virus. The interactions between the two were evident 
when the bupati issued a circular letter to all village heads, asking them 
to increase their awareness of the risks of COVID-19. In this circular 
letter, the bupati instructed all village heads to immediately utilize 
their village funds for COVID-19 handling at the village level (Basri 
2020). As political elites, they need to formulate effective policies, and 
successful implementation requires highly committed local leaders. As 
previously explained, the shift in elite power relationships after the refor-
masi affected the relationships between village heads and the state (i.e., 
heads of districts and regents), making them more mutually dependent 
upon each other and allowing them to be more transactional (table 1). 
Aspinall and Rohman (2017) highlighted the shifts in power relation-
ships since the enactment of Law No. 6/2014, where the relationships 
between village heads and the state have become more fluid from what 
was previously more rigid and hierarchical. Village heads now have 
more leverage in politics because while they need the bupati, the bupati 
also needs the village heads’ support.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the relationship between the 
bupati and village leaders became relatively more equal due to the 
collaboration between them in handling the virus. As explained by 
the head of Taman Village, Sampang’s achievement in maintaining 
its green zone status was heavily shaped by the role of both the people 
and government. 
“I particularly appreciate Pak Bupati (of) Sampang. He has been 
very motivated in visiting the villages, even up until 2:00 AM. He 
even went to the areas bordering Sampang and Bangkalan. All these 
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borders were consistently monitored by the bupati. He also moni-
tored the implementation of both the programs from the Sampang 
government and village heads. So, I did not only hear about the 
hard work of the Sampang government; I experienced it myself.”. 
(Muarif, Head of Taman Village, May 15, 2020. Interviewed by Au-
thor. Sampang)
The Sampang bupati said that his region’s achievement in maintaining 
its green zone status for the most prolonged period in East Java was a 
straight fact. According to him, this success was due to earlier anticipa-
tion before any formal instructions from the central government were 
issued to Sampang. An example of this was the formulation of guide-
lines for all state employees and heads of state agencies in Sampang who 
were attending meetings outside the regency as well as the obligation 
to obtain permits from the bupati when they do so. He also employed 
a strategy to teach and urge the people to follow physical distancing 
measures, which entailed the building of three command posts (Posko) 
at the regency level, fourteen at the district level, and posts in each vil-
lage. The village heads worked in cooperation with community health 
centers to collect data and monitor the mobility of incoming travelers, 
who were regarded as persons under risk. The enactment of these pro-
cedures has contributed to Sampang’s ability to stay in the green zone 
(Slamet Junaidi, Regent of Sampang. April 14, 2020. Interviewed by 
Author. Sampang). 
This emergence of such collaborative power relationships between 
the bupati and village heads during the pandemic was a different phe-
nomenon from the ones found by previous studies, which showed re-
lationships during ‘normal times’ and are more transactional or used 
to serve the self-interests of those of certain groups and party elites 
(Aspinall and Rohman 2017; Kuncoro 2013; Muslim 2016, 76). As a lo-
cal political elite, the bupati acknowledges that he is not able to control 
the spread of COVID-19 without the involvement of the village heads. 
Similarly, the village heads need support from the regency to protect 
their villagers from the virus in the form of government programs. If 
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the village heads fail keeping their villagers safe, they may lose their 
influence in their respective villages. Thus, if the previous relationships 
between the village heads and bupati were transactional, they have 
shifted to become more collaborative during the pandemic. If they 
succeed in containing the spread of the virus and maintain their green 
zone status, their legitimacy will be strengthened.
PROGR A MM ATIC GOODS DUR ING 
THE PA NDEMIC IN SA MPA NG
In the previous sections, we have discussed that programmatic goods 
refer to resources distributed by regional governments to aid the people, 
particularly, in this context, those heavily impacted by COVID-19 in 
Sampang. These programs were ideally formulated based on problems 
identified by the village authority, followed by the village heads’ rec-
ommendation of programmatic goods, which were then sent to the 
supra-village structures or regency government. If we view this from a 
distributive politics perspective, programmatic politics is different from 
the practice of patronage-clientelism, which is defined as the distribu-
tion of goods with the intention of getting votes or winning elections. 
Programmatic goods, on the other hand, are not distributed to mobilize 
the electorate.  
Patronage falls under the category of non-programmatic politics. 
Several examples of this practice include the provision of cash, goods, 
services, and other economic benefits (e.g., employment or contracts) 
from politicians’ own finances or pork barrel projects (Aspinall and Suk-
majati 2014). Conversely, programmatic goods during the pandemic—
such as healthcare—were more targeted towards the villagers’ safety. 
Here we further elaborate that programmatic distributive politics 
consists of three criteria. First is the accuracy of the programs’ beneficia-
ries. The second is the open nature of the information on the programs 
formulated to address public problems. The third is the commitment 
to implement programs without discrimination.
The Sampang government implemented several strategies in com-
bating COVID-19. These included the bupati’s immediate instruction 
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for village heads to make use of the available resources to contain the 
spread of COVID-19. These instructions were based on the Minister 
of Villages’ Regulation No. 6/2020 on the Prioritization of the Use 
of Village Funds, allowing village authorities to use village funds to 
handle COVID-19 (Slamet Junaidi, Regent of Sampang. April 14, 2020. 
Interviewed by Author. Sampang). Village authorities receive dana desa 
(DD) not only from the central government—through the Ministry of 
Village, Development of Disadvantaged Regions and Transmigration—
but also from the regional budget through alokasi dana desa (ADD).
Using the theory of distributive politics, the DD and ADD can be 
categorized as material resources for the medical countermeasures and 
the mitigation of economic impacts for villagers who lost their income. 
In the context of public policy, it is part of the strategic utilization of 
resources to mitigate public problems. It is also one of the forms of 
continuous intervention by the government to cater to the interests of 
the vulnerable and help them survive and participate in the governance 
(Chandler and Plano 1988). Table 2 below shows that there has been an 
increase in the allocation of ADD and DD in Sampang during the CO-
VID-19 pandemic, compared to the funding in the two previous years. 
Table 2. ADD and DD Allocation in Sampang, from 2018–2020
Component 2018 2019 2020
Alokasi Dana Desa (ADD) 89,064,000,000 94,029,837,000 94,449,560,000
Dana Desa (DD) 179,206,655,000 232,543,589,000 233,187,661,000
Note: Compiled from various sources.
The distribution of material resources through DD and ADD required 
executors. In this case, they were the village heads who acted as bro-
kers for these government programs and held strategic positions in the 
distribution of resources (through these programs) during the pandem-
ic. This is because the Ministry of Villages, through Regulation No. 
6/2020 and Circular Letter No. 8/2020 on the COVID-19 Response 
Village (Desa Tanggap COVID-19) appoints village heads as the head 
of volunteers in the Desa Lawan COVID-19 (loosely translated as Vil-
lages against COVID-19) program. Village heads were also appointed 
as persons in charge and tasked to gather information on villagers who 
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were entitled to receive direct cash transfers. Based on our interviews 
with several village leaders, welfare programs for the people were not 
only initiated by the state government, but also other parties such as the 
military, police, and state-owned and private companies (Village Heads 
in Sampang Regency, pers. comm. May 14–15, 2020). 
I will now further elaborate on the distribution of programmatic 
goods in Sampang during the pandemic. The first program was the 
setting up of volunteer posts in every village in Sampang. The village 
heads acted as the head of the villages’ volunteer team, which was 
tasked to form posts as well as gather information on homecoming 
travelers (also known as pemudik). These volunteers were also tasked to 
socialize the four coordination agreements made between the bupati, 
the Islamic clerics, and Forum Komunikasi Pimpinan Daerah (the Re-
gional Leadership Communication Forum) in Sampang to the people. 
These agreements were the prohibitions to hold imtihan1, celebrations 
for Isra’ Miraj, wedding receptions, and mass gatherings that exceeded 
thirty people (Slamet Junaidi, Regent of Sampang. April 14, 2020. Inter-
viewed by Author. Sampang). All the interviewed village heads said that 
the posts were built at the village council, and there was always some-
body at these posts to anticipate sudden inspections from the regency 
authority, as the bupati often carried out blusukan to the villages. The 
village heads said that the volunteers’ operational funds were from the 
DD and ADD. These funds were used to disinfect public spaces, the 
installment of washbasins and sterilization cubicles, and the provision of 
logistics such as meals and cigarettes for the volunteers. Several village 
heads also had to use their personal expenses to fund the operations 
of the volunteer teams (Zainuddin, Head of Bapelle Village. May 14, 
2020. Interviewed by Author. Sampang). 
The installment of posts and the formation of volunteer teams meet 
the criteria of programmatic goods, particularly the criterion about the 
1 Haflatul Imtihan is an act of gratitude for the end of exams. This tradition is deemed to hold 
deep sociological values and consists of engaging events. The celebration is normally held by 
Islamic boarding schools, but people living around the schools are also usually involved. Activi-
ties that are usually held throughout the week include religious competitions and sports, such 
as poetry reading, recitation of the kitab kuning (lit: yellow book), and soccer. See Faisol 2016.
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indiscriminate nature of the distribution. An example of this is the 
provision of village hotlines for emergencies. The implementation of 
this policy resulted from a discussion between the village heads and 
public figures in the regency. This discussion meant that information 
was open and that the village heads were responsible for the socializa-
tion (sosialisasi) of the policy to their villagers. The village authority 
was committed to not discriminate in its provision of these programs. 
This was demonstrated in the case of Panggung Village, in which the 
volunteer team was involved in arranging the funeral of a villager who 
was a patient under supervision (Pasien Dalam Pengawasan or PDP) 
and died in Surabaya, which was a red zone at the time. Although the 
village head was harshly scolded by the Sampang government for the 
burial permit, he confirmed that there had been no rejections from 
his villagers about the matter as the convoy of cars that escorted the 
deceased was told to return to Surabaya after the burial immediately. 
They also followed the bupati’s instructions not to gather in crowds 
(Subaidi, Head of Panggung Village. May 14, 2020. Interviewed by 
Author. Sampang). 
The second was the free masks program. Our interview with the 
bupati of Sampang reveals that the funding for distributing masks at 
the village level could be sourced from the village funds. Therefore, 
village heads were expected to purchase cotton masks produced by local 
tailors from their villages (Slamet Junaidi, Regent of Sampang, April 
14, 2020. Interviewed by Author. Sampang). This distribution was sup-
ported by each village’s volunteer team. However, several village heads 
were directly involved in handing out masks to the villagers to show-
case their seriousness and care. Following the bupati’s programs, the 
majority of village heads provided a minimum of two washable masks, 
and the production of masks was done by the villages’ local tailors, 
but in the case of shortage, village authorities were able to purchase 
from tailors at other villages from the same district. The implication of 
this policy—apart from health-related benefits—was that it aided the 
economy and helped micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises that 
experienced slumps in sales due to the pandemic. These masks fall 
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under the category of programmatic goods as they were provided to 
all villagers without discrimination. Village heads and volunteer teams 
were optimistic that the villagers were aware of the necessity of wearing 
masks, especially after socialization efforts by the village authorities.  
Third was the cash transfer program (Bantuan Langsung Tunai-
Dana Desa or BLT-DD) for villagers in Sampang. The money was given 
out in cash in sixty villages before Eid al-Fitr, and via bank transfer 
in 120 villages after Eid. This program’s recipients were legally made 
transparent, qualifying the program as a programmatic good. According 
to the Minister of Villages’ Regulation No. 6/2020, villagers entitled to 
receive BLT-DD are those from low income-households and are not 
registered as recipients of the Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH) or 
Bantuan Pangan Non-Tunai (BPNT) schemes, have lost their sources 
of income due to COVID-19, and/or have family members who are (or 
are likely to become) chronically ill. 
However, it has also been asked whether there has been discrimina-
tion and a lack of transparency in the distribution of these cash transfers. 
This was reflected in the demonstrations by several non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), who demanded transparency and acceleration in 
the distribution of the transfers. These demonstrations were held at two 
locations, the Community and Village Empowerment Agency (Dinas 
Pemberdayaan Masyarakat dan Desa or DPMD)—where the NGOs de-
manded that the head of the agency, Malik Amrullah, step down from 
his position—and the Robatal District. The management of the Associa-
tion of Village Heads (Asosiasi Kepala Desa or AKD) made attempts to 
meet the protesting activists in a formal hearing. However, the activists 
rejected the offer because their protests were directed towards the head 
of the DPMD and head of the Robatal District (Regamedianews 2020). 
In the case of the demonstrations at the Robatal District office, 
Abdul Hamid, the head of the Robatal AKD, clarified that no discrimi-
nation has occurred during the distribution of the BLT-DD and the list 
of cash recipients have been publicly discussed through musyawarah 
desa, where the public could access information on who the recipients 
were. He added that while the exchange between him and the demon-
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strators went emotional, it was mainly a matter of communication. To 
Abdul Hamid, nearly 90% of the BLT-DD transfers were accurate, and 
if any mistakes happened, they were not intentional. Accidents were 
possible mainly because the BLT-DD distribution almost coincided 
with the gathering of additional data for the Program Keluarga Harapan 
scheme from the central government. It was thus possible that some 
people received both the benefits of the BLT-DD and the PKH (Abdul 
Hamid, Head of the Robatal District AKD. June 13, 2020. Interviewed 
by Author. Sampang). 
The fourth program was the distribution of grocery packages for 
villagers in Sampang. For this program, village heads organized and 
gathered packages from various sources, such as the central government 
(who provided the BPNT), the regency government, the police, the 
military, and state as well as private companies. As brokers of this aid 
program, village heads gathered data on those entitled to receive the aid 
packages. This process was followed by the strategy of putting stickers 
on the houses of these recipients to show that they have received the 
aid. In distributing aid packages from the regency government, a ‘by 
name, by address’ data-gathering scheme was used to allocate prioritized 
packages for art communities in the villages. The distribution of these 
packages is a form of programmatic politics because its allocation is in 
accordance with the list of rightful recipients. However, several village 
leaders complained that the number of packages, from both the gov-
ernment and other sources, was insufficient to meet everyone’s needs. 
To deal with this problem, some had to use their own money to fund 
additional packages. This was done out of commitment and to show 
there was no discrimination in the distribution of aid, although the 
village heads were reluctant to reveal who received the packages that 
were bought using their personal expenses due to privacy.
The fifth was the Desa Pintar (Smart Village) program that provides 
free internet to those impacted by the pandemic in Sampang. The 
pandemic has made the governments of areas in the red zone enact 
Large-Scale Social Restrictions (Pembatasan Sosial Berskala Besar or 
PSBB), which prohibited people from going back to their hometowns. 
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In the case of Sampang, village heads said that they advised their people 
who were still in the red zones not to come home temporarily. People 
resorted to meet virtually through the internet instead. Previously, the 
Sampang government has installed internet towers in every village. 
A village head said that this program has been beneficial during the 
pandemic, as there has been an increase in the number of people who 
communicated with their families through Whatsapp (Siban, Head of 
the Disanah Village. May 14, 2020. Interviewed by Author. Sampang). 
The free internet program also fulfills the criteria of the programmatic 
goods. This is because all villagers were able to access its benefits. To 
avoid discrimination in the provision of internet services, the regency 
government has prohibited any installment of (additional) routers close 
to the houses of village leaders. Nearly all the main internet towers were 
built at the village councils.
The range of the signal is quite varied in the villages; in some vil-
lages, the signal was able to cover the entire village with the installment 
of additional routers in every hamlet (dusun), in some the signal was 
only accessible from a close distance from the village authority’s offices. 
In contrast, in some others the internet connection was terribly slow 
that nobody could virtually use it, such as in Labang Village and Rapa 
Laok Village. All the village heads said that the free internet program 
was funded through the village funds scheme. Before the formulation 
and enactment of the scheme, a public discussion (musyawarah desa) 
was held to socialize the program and involve the people in the process. 
The conditions of the internet towers in Sampang can be observed in 
the following table: 
Most programmatic policies at the village level in Sampang during 
the pandemic were funded through the DD and the ADD schemes. 
These policies will indirectly shape political support for the incumbent 
village heads and the bupati if they are to run again for public office, 
with the condition that the benefits of the policies have been received 
by all the members of their respective villages. The effective implemen-
tation of the programs is likely to strengthen the village heads’ and the 
bupati’s legitimacy, giving them an edge in the next election. 
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Table 3. Desa Pintar Program in Sampang
Village District Tower Signal Coverage
Jelgung Robatal Built - Functioning Entire village
Bapelle Robatal Built - Functioning Village council
Noreh Sreseh Built - Functioning Village council
Disanah Sreseh Built - Functioning Entire village
Labang Sreseh Built – Non-functioning None
Rapa Laok Omben Built – Non-functioning None
Napo Daya Omben Built - Functioning Village council
Taman Jrengik Built - Functioning Village council
Mlaka Jrengik Built - Functioning Village council
Panggung Sampang Built - Functioning Village council
Sources: Interviews with the Respective Village Heads.
Interviews with the village heads and the bupati have revealed that the 
primary motivation behind the channeling of the DD and the ADD 
funds was programmatic rather than non-programmatic (patronage, 
clientelism, and pork barrel politics). This shows that the village heads, 
on the one hand, have been hierarchically accountable to the supra-
village structures regarding the realization of government aid programs 
for the people during the pandemic. On the other hand, they have also 
maintained their informal authority as the patron for their clients—their 
people—or as bapak pelindung desa by protecting their people from the 
pandemic risk. These tasks were carried out through the distribution 
of programmatic goods. 
CONCLUSION
This article finds that Sampang’s achievement in maintaining its green 
zone status for the longest period in East Java was due to the collabora-
tion among local political elites in implementing programmatic poli-
cies to handle the COVID-19 pandemic. Based on the three criteria 
of programmatic goods, there were at least five programmatic policies 
in Sampang’s villages. The first policy was the installment of volunteer 
posts to handle matters relating to the COVID-19 pandemic. The sec-
ond was the distribution of free masks to villagers. The third program 
was the transfer of BLT-DD for people from low-income households 
and those impacted by the pandemic. The fourth was the distribution of 
aid packages, and the fifth was the provision of free internet across the 
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villages. The case of Sampang demonstrated the role of village heads in 
distributing resources through programmatic politics by meeting three 
criteria. These criteria were 1) accuracy in the distribution of policy 
benefits; 2) the public nature of the information on the enacted poli-
cies; and 3) commitment to implement the formulated policies without 
discrimination (Aspinall and Sukmajati 2015; Stokes 2009).
This study also discovers that the village heads in Sampang have 
acted as effective brokers in distributing programmatic goods from the 
supra-village bureaucracy—the head of districts and the bupati—to 
tackle the COVID-19 pandemic. During the pandemic, the relation-
ships between the bupati and village heads have shown to be more 
collaborative in maximizing the use of power resources to contain the 
spread of the virus. The pandemic has contributed to the shaping of 
these collaborative relationships through programmatic politics and 
lessened the likelihood for the transactional relations more commonly 
associated with non-programmatic politics.
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